1. New York v. United States, (1992)

2. Facts: In 1985, Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which was intended to solve a national problem of the disposal of low-level radioactive waste by providing a procedure for states to either group together into regional compacts, each dumping their waste into a single site in one of the compact states, or find their own waste disposal area. The Act had three provisions: 1) monetary incentives which allowed site states to charge increasingly higher surcharges to non-pact states for disposal of their waste, part of which surcharges would be refunded to the states by the Secretary of Energy if they complied with a timeline for finding their own disposal sites, 2) access incentives which allowed site states to deny access to non-pact states after a few years, and 3) a “take-title” provision which required the delinquent states to take possession and title of the radioactive waste and assume liability for it if they remained delinquent to the end. New York decided to dispose of its own waste, and did not join a regional pact. However, the state had problems locating the site within its borders because the local citizens did not want it.

3. Procedural Posture: The state of New York brought this action to seek a declaratory judgment that the Act was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.

4. Issue: Whether Congress may direct or otherwise compel a State to regulate a particular private field in a particular way.

5. Holding: No.

6. ∏ Argument: The 10th amendment forbids Congress from directly regulating the states to compel them to carry out federal regulation in this private field. Although they unquestionably have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the generators of the waste, they do not have the power to compel the states to directly regulate the waste generators in a particular manner. The Act “commandeers the legislative processes of the states.” Furthermore, the second part of the act which provides for monetary incentives is beyond Congress’ spending power. Lastly, the Act violates the Guarantee Clause because it attempts to undermine the states’ own republican form of government.

7. ∆ Argument: The Constitution’s prohibition of convressional directives to state governments can be overcome where the federal interest is sufficiently important to justify state submission. Also, the Constitution does, in some circumstances, permit federal directives to state governments. Lastly, the Constitution envisions a role for Congress as an arbiter of state disputes.

8. Majority Reasoning: The Tenth Amendment is a truism that simply directs the court to examine what are the internal limitations to the powers granted to Congress in Article I. So the court must examine the Commerce Power, the Spending Power, and the Supremacy Clause. The basic premise is that under Hodel, Congress may not simply “commandeer” the state governmental processes. Nothing in the Constitution implies that Congress has the ability to require states to govern by federal coercion. This premise is supported by looking at the Framer’s intent when they chose the structure that the Congress would exercise its power directly over individuals rather than over states as intermediaries. Although Congress can motivate or encourage states to regulate in a certain way by making federal assistance conditional or by giving them the choice between doing it themselves or having the federal government do it for them by preemption, it can not directly compel. This enables state governments to be directly responsive and accountable to the local electorate. Where the federal government compels regulation, the state officials take the brunt, while the federal officials remain insulated, thus reducing accountability in the political process. Construing the Act in a light most favorable to the United States, the “take title” provision is still clearly beyond Congress’ power because Congress neither has the power to force states to take title to the waste (thereby subsidizing the generators) nor does it have the power to compel regulation. That there is a very strong federal interest in controlling waste does not allow Congress to go beyond the Constitution. Even if New York state itself agreed to the bargain, the state is powerless to waive the Constitutional limits on Congressional power because the Constitution is for the protection of individuals. The other parts of the Act are Constitutional because neither monetary incentives nor access denials can reasonably be said to deny a State a republican form of government.

9. Concurrence/Dissent Reasoning: [White] reasoned that the majority had taken the Act out of its historical context and its contractual setting. The states, including New York, got together to reach their own agreement on how the radioactive waste crisis should be handled. They did not seek federal pre-emption, but rather federal sanction of their pact under Article I, Section 10 which states that “no state shall, without the consent of Congress,...enter into any agreement or Compact with another State.” Thus New York should be estopped from asserting the unconstitutionality of a bargain that it had derived substantial benefit from.