1. Zablocki v. Redhail, (1978)

2. Facts: A Wisconsin law required that a person who had a child who he was required to pay child support on must gain the permission of the court before remarrying. Redhail, a deadbeat dad with an illegitimate daughter, applied for a marriage license but was denied because he did not ask the court for permission.

3. Procedural Posture: Redhail brought a class action suit to invalidate the statute.

4. Issue: Whether the Wisconsin law is consitutional.

5. Holding: No.

6. Majority Reasoning: [Marshall] stated that the right to marry is of fundamental importance and since the statute significantly interferes with that right, “critical examination” of the state interests is required. Reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to marry may be legitimately imposed, however, this law did “directly and substantially” interfere. A “critical examination” means that the law “cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” Although the interests were legitimate, there was a bad means-ends fit. The statute did not provide for counseling (as was one of the asserted interests). Also, there were less intrusive means for “exacting compliance with support obligations,” such as civil and criminal penalties. The net result of preventing marriage is more illegitimate children.

7. Concurrence Reasoning: [Powell] felt that the majority opinion was too broad because it required too strict of scrutiny in an area that was traditionally subject to state regulation. Particularly, that a sphere of privacy exists between married couples does not require that the same level of scrutiny be applied to regulations of entry into marriage. [Stevens] found that the constitution allowed “direct and substantial” regulation of marriage, but rested his concurrence on equal protection grounds - this statute discriminated against the poor. [Stewart] rested his concurrence entirely on substantive due process grounds, feeling that the equal protection standards proposed by other opinions were “no more than due process by another name.”