1. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm’n., (1983)
2. Facts: A California law imposed a moratorium on the certification of nuclear energy plants until a state agency found that there existed a demonstrated means for disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated by the nuclear power plants. There was evidence in the State legislative record that the law was passed for economical reasons, such as regulating the price of electricity, because an increase in the number of nuclear power plants without an increase in radioactive disposal capacity could result in the shutdown of existing plants and the subsequent instability of electricity prices.
3. Procedural Posture: P.G.&E. brought an action for declaratory judgment against the law, claiming that it was preemted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The District Court granted relief, the Court of Appeal reversed, and P.G.&E. appealed to the Supreme Court.
4. Issue: Whether the California statutory moratorium on the certification of nuclear power plants is preemted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
5. Holding: No.
6. ∏ Argument: 1. The state law is preempted because it regulates construction of nuclear plants based on safety reasons. Since the AEA’s primary function is exclusive federal safety regulation, there is no room here for the state to regulate. 2. The statute conflicts with actual decisions made by Congress and the NRC. 3. The statute frustrates the AEA’s goal of the development of nuclear technology.
7. ∆ Argument: Although safety regulation of nuclear plants is forbidden, a state may completely prohibit new construction until its safety concerns are satisfied by the federal government.
8. Majority Reasoning: Historically, the federal government has taken efforts to ensure that nuclear power is developed and operated safely, while leaving police regulations of the economics of electricity generated by nuclear energy to the states themselves. This is evidenced by the AEA’s own language when it states that nothing in it is to be construed as affecting the authority of any local government to regulate the “generation, sale or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities.” Thus, the federal government has explicitly left this power to the states; it is not impliedly preempted by the mere existence of the AEA. However, the federal goverment, by the AEA, has exclusively retained the right to regulate nuclear safety, and so the state has no power to regulate in that specific area. Since there is legislative history evidence that the law was passed as primarily an economic, and not a safety matter, the court accepted California’s representation that they were not attempting to regulate safety. Even though the Congress and the NRC have recently passed legislation that it is safe and permissible to continue to certify new power plants, the state is in no way compelled to do so. Thus, compliance with both the federal and state statutes are possible here, and so the statute is not expressly preempted. Lastly, the even though the AEA’s purpose was to promote the safe development and use of nuclear energy, that was not to be accomplished at all costs. So the statute is not impliedly preempted as being an obstruction of a Congressional purpose.
9. Notes: In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., (1947), Justice Douglas stated that the test in whether a local law was preempted was the intent of Congress. In areas that were traditionally state-regulated, any action by Congress was presumed not to preempt unless it was the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” There were three ways to divine this purpose: 1. If the federal scheme of regulation was so pervasive as to infer that Congress left no room for state regulation, 2. Where the federal interest is so dominant that it outweighs the state interests, and 3. The state law produces a result inconsistent with the federal objective. Note the similarity between this analysis of preemption by actual legislation, and the Cooley “balancing” analysis with regard to the dormant commerce clause. In Campbell v. Hussey (1961), Justice Douglas’ plurality opinion struck down a local Georgia statute requiring that tobacco that was grown (locally) according to federal regulations be marked with a white tag (tobacco grown out-of-state in Carolina was to be marked with a blue tag). He rejected the argument that the Georgia statute was constitutional because it merely “supplemented” the federal regulations. In this case the question of preemption did not need actual conflict between the federal and state law, because one could draw an inference from the structure of the federal regulation scheme that there was no room for state augmentation. [See point 1 in Rice, above.] Compare this result with the commerce clause rejection under the rationale of local discrimination in the Washington Apple case. However, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, the court distinguished Campbell by stating that there was neither an actual nor presumed conflict based on the federal regulatory design.
