1. Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, (1942)
2. Facts: ∆ was a jehovah’s witness, who upon being escorted away from a public disturbance that he had created, told an officer that he was “damned facist” and a “damned racketeer.”
3. Procedural Posture: ∆ was convicted under a statute which prohibited speech that were “likely to cause an average addressee to fight.”
4. Issue: Whether words “plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee” are protected by the First Amendment.
5. Holding: No.
6. Reasoning: The right of free speech is not absolute at all times. These are “fighting words” which by their very nature tend to inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. They are not an essential part of the expositionof ideas that were meant to be protected by the First amendment. Also, lewd, obscene, profane, and libelous words are not protected.
7. Notes: The lewd, obscene, profane, and libelous speech has been protected to some degree since Chaplinski. However, “fighting words” survives to a limited extent as an exception to free speech. However, in Gooding v. Wilson, (1972), the court held 4-3 that a statute that was so broadly written that it covered speech “not plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee” was unconstitutional on its face. Thus, the court is not likely to broaden the scope of the Chaplinski holding.
