- I. The Structure of Defense Decision Making
- 1. There have been different perceptions of the military, ranging from brilliant to idiotic.
- 2. One view of the military holds it as a vital function of the federal gov’t, operating under majoritarian politics, while another holds it as a gigantic confused system that exposes innocent men and women to unnecessary hazards to satisfy client politics.
- i. According to the first view, everyone pays for protection provided for everybody; after World War II, the U.S. grew a large standing army because it recognized world threats.
- ii. The second view maintains that only the generals, admirals, big corporations, and the members of Congress whose districts get fat defense contracts are the only winners, and that the military-industrial complex, or the supposedly unified political bloc consisting of the Defense Department and industries that build military weapons, had too big of shares.
- 3. Citizens regularly desire to control the army (not the other way around), and the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, headed by a secretary of defense who must be a civilian, helped to ensure this want.
- i. Under the secretary of defense are the secretaries of the army, navy, and air force (also civilians), which basically maintain the “housekeeping” functions of the various armed forces.
- ii. The four branches of the armed services cannot merge, thus preventing them from coming together and growing too politically powerful, and the result is desired competition.
- a. The navy and air force have argued over building aircraft carriers and fighter jets.
- iii. Congress didn’t want the armed forces to be unified, but being too autonomous was not good either, so in 1986, it passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which increased the powers of the officers but left the 1947 structure pretty much intact, revised, of course.
- 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a committee of the uniformed heads of the four military services (army, navy, air force, Marine Corps), a chairman, and a nonvoting vice chairman, and while it has no command authority over troops, it is heavily involved in national defense planning.
- i. The Joint Staff assists the JCS and plans for various military contingencies, and after 1986, it was more unified and less divided among the four branches.
- 5. There are eight Unified Commands and two “specified commands” that control forces in various parts of the world and handle Special Forces (army Rangers or navy Seals), and after 1986, they became more unified and more powerful also.
- 6. A civilian secretary in charge of purchasing, auditing, congressional relations, and public affairs, and a senior military officer who oversees discipline and training of forces head each military service.
- 7. The president is commander in chief, and the chain of command goes down to the secretary of defense and then other various commands (civilians are in charge to prevent army coups, etc…).
- i. The quick victory in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War may be a sign that the 1986 reform law was successful and effective.
- II. The Defense Budget
- 1. How big the defense budget is reflects majoritarian politics; how it is divided reflects client politics.
- 2. Before WWII, America didn’t maintain large armed forces during peacetime; those came only during war.
- i. After the war, though, defense spending didn’t return to pre-war levels, and during the 1950s, defense spending soared.
- ii. America did not completely disarm because of its containment policy to keep Communist U.S.S.R. in check; instead, it built up a military system designed to aid Western Europe in case of a Soviet invasion and help allies resist smaller uprisings or invasions.
- iii. Public opinion has generally favored lowering defense spending, especially between active conflicts, but fear of the Soviet Union usually made this unlikely until the U.S.S.R. fell in 1991.
- iv. With the fall of the Soviets, liberals now argue that defense should be cut to give aid to other programs, but conservatives say the world is still dangerous and defense should not dip.
- 3. Operation Desert Storm postponed but didn’t end the debate over military spending, although it did show the world was still a dangerous place and the U.S. had to defend it.
- i. Because America won so swiftly and convincingly, though, some people felt the U.S. was invincible and should rely on “smart weapons” only.
- 4. The defense budget is the easiest to be cut from, though, and many presidents looking for money to put on other programs usually look toward defense first; even Bush began to cut defense money.
- i. Of course, cutting defense too much means putting the workers who build the submarines, planes, and other military equipment and weapons, etc… out of business.
- ii. There is still debate that the defense budge is being cut too fast or not fast enough, though.
- 5. Every branch of the military does not want cuts in its branch only, so the president is more successful getting an across-the-board cut on all the branches.
- i. Generally, the JCS favors plans that benefit all but not those that hurt all, and helping some and hurting others almost never happens.
- ii. The major questions usually involve what items to add on a services existing budget, not which budget to cut so that another can have a rise, and the expensive weapon systems, like the B-1 and B-2 bombers, the MX missile, the Trident nuclear sub, and the M1 tank are heavily debated by the White House, Pentagon, Congress, and various interest groups.
- a. Strategic, economic, and political factors all come forth during such debates.
- 6. During World War II, Congress typically agreed with everyone, but afterwards, it tended to disagree with the president, all the while expanding its power to affect certain military decisions.
- i. Since the Vietnam War, Congress has been heavily involved in almost all decisions concerning new weapon systems.
- ii. The debate over the strategic defense initiative (a.k.a. “Star Wars”) reflected both majoritarian and client politics and discussed the system’s cost, likely successes, and deterrence of war.
- iii. Also, some traditional defense contractors worried that SDI wouldn’t be as profitable for them.
- III. What Do We Buy for Our Money?
- 1. We buy people (soldiers, etc…), hardware (bombers to hammers), and “readiness” (training, supply, munitions, fuel, and food).
- 2. The size of the armed forces has been shrinking, even though Congress abolished the draft (first used in WWII) and replaced it with the all-volunteer force, although more and more women have become recruits (they were banned from “combat roles” until 1993).
- i. Congress still must be consulted if women are to be in front-line forces; on the policy of homosexuals in the military, President Bill Clinton settled on the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.
- 3. People hear about cost overruns almost every single time the Pentagon buys a new submarine, airplane, or missile, where actual costs are far greater than estimated costs, but these happen because:
- i. It’s hard to know how much something that’s never been built will cost.
- ii. People who want to persuade Congress to build a new whatever underestimate; it’s better.
- iii. The Pentagon officials who decide what kind of new plane to buy want the best one, which is more expensive; asking for everything is often called gold plating.
- iv. Many new weapons are purchased from a single contractor who controls all, including price.
- v. Congress often stretches out the number of years that it will buy weapons, thus driving up prices buy ordering a lot one year and less in other years.
- a. Some of these problems are being dealt with, btw.
- 4. The “$435 hammer” is a myth that grew out of a misunderstood accounting procedure that basically made everything cost the same, so there were a lot of “under-priced” items too.
- i. The problem here is that some basic supplies become so custom-made that they’re rip-offs.
- 5. Training and readiness are the easiest things to cut, and thus, they have very low priorities, even though common sense would hold otherwise; this could actually end up screwing us over…
- 6. At one time, the opening/closing of military bases was all client politics, which mean that most were opened and few were closed (base in one’s district = more $$$), and in 1988, Congress finally figured out that no base would close unless the system was changed, so it created the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, consisting of private citizens who would consider recommendations from the secretary of defense.
- i. This basically recommended which bases to close, and Congress, powerless to pick which bases to protect, finally began closing more military bases.
- IV. Congress versus the Executive
- 1. During WWII and shortly after, Congress was relatively passive in defense spending matters, but ever since the Vietnam War, it has been very involved by asserting its interest in defense (micromanaging).
- i. In an era of budget deficits, Congressmen are attracted to large standing peacetime armies, and they are very interested in all defense decisions, since they are almost veto-proof, and lots of pet projects can be attached to them.
- ii. This is where a Congressman has the best chance to do something good for his/her district by attaching a beneficial program to a defense program!
- 1. During WWII and shortly after, Congress was relatively passive in defense spending matters, but ever since the Vietnam War, it has been very involved by asserting its interest in defense (micromanaging).
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